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ABSTRACT 
 
Female Migration and Native Marital Stability: 
Insights from Italy* 
 
In this paper, we argue that the size and the composition of the female migrant population in 
a given area can affect the marital stability of natives. We take Italy as a case-study and we 
offer discrete-time event history models predicting marital disruption on data from the 
nationally – representative 2009 Family and Social Subjects survey. We found that the 
increasing presence of first mover migrant women (coming from Latin America and Eastern 
Europe) is associated with higher separation risks among natives, especially for couples with 
lower human capital. Our findings add to our understanding of family formation and 
dissolution dynamics in recent immigration countries. 
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1. Motivation 
Over the last decades, research has mainly focused on the labor market implications of 
migration. Most attention has been given to migrants displacing natives in terms of wage or 
employment, or both. Several scholars have shown that, whereas a certain replacement effect 
in the labor market is found for lower levels of skills and education (Venturini & Villosio, 
2006, Dalla Zuanna & Weber, 2011; Ottaviano & Peri, 2012; Dustmann et al., 2013), migrants 
do not necessarily negatively affect native workers’ wages and their probability of transition 
from unemployment to employment (Gavosto et al., 1999; Venturini & Villosio, 2006; 
Ottaviano & Peri, 2012). In addition, recent studies focusing on female migrants working as 
housekeepers or as care workers has demonstrated that female migrants are complementary to 
native highly-skilled females in the labor market. In other terms, migrant women allow native 
women to work for more hours (e.g. Barone & Mocetti, 2010, Cortes & Tessada, 2011, Ferre, 
Gonzales, Ortega, 2011) and to reduce their traditional early retirement practices to take care 
of elderly parents (Romiti & Rossi, 2011). These considerations involve countries where the 
family is largely responsible for family services and where men still invest little time in 
housework and care activities. Previous studies suggested that the growing presence of migrant 
women positively affects the life of many families, enabling native women to stay in the labor 
market while providing domestic assistance for elderly or sick relatives. Nevertheless, the 
question of whether and how natives’ family dynamics are affected by the increasing presence 
of female migrants, has scarcely been explored 
 
We wish to study this question here by focusing on the effect of (female) migrants on the 
native marriage market. Research has noted that the divorce rate tends to be higher when there 
is a surplus of marriageable women (Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993). Migration often brings just 
such a surplus women, and these women may be a factor in the breakdown of native marriages. 
In addition, if the supply of women increases, men who earlier were not able to find a marriage 
4 
partner may now find one. Sarret and Vitali (2015), after all, have shown that the increasing 
presence of foreign women means an increase in mixed marriages, helping to balance the 
contemporary loss of marriages among natives. Overall, we hypothesize that the increasing 
presence of female migrants facilitates the disruption of established couples and favors the 
formation of new couples. This (new) framework of divorce and remarriage may be especially 
valid for men with lower education, who may prefer a female partner used to traditional (and 
subordinate) gender roles. 
In this paper, we outline this approach by addressing the former part of the argument, namely 
whether the size and the composition of the female migrant population in a certain area affects 
the dissolution of native marriages. We take Italy as a case-study because it exemplifies a male-
breadwinner society, and because it is a relatively new immigration country. 
2. The Rationale of the study 
2.1 A model for the interplay between marriage market and migration 
We can usefully compare the marriage market to a labor market. Let us imagine that there 
is a bundle of goods and services provided in a marriage, e.g., shirt ironing, food preparation, 
company, protection, sexual intercourse, and so on. Within this market there are two types of 
agents: the first who demands marriage services; and the second who provides marriage 
services. In our model, the first are men and women are the second. There are limitations to 
this old-fashioned model. There may be cases where women demand and men provide; there 
are same sex couples; and many other dimensions, but this stylized model should help in 
depicting marriage dynamics1. 
Formally, to get marriage services, the demander, has to provide remuneration R. The higher 
the remuneration needed, the lower the demand. The demand function is thus down sloping: 
QmsD = Q0 – aR with   a, Q0, R >0 [1]
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where QmsD are the amount of marriage services demanded, which depend on Q0,the level of 
marriage services demanded when the remuneration R is set tat 0, and a, a propensity to 
consume marriage services that multiplies the remuneration R. 
The supply of marriage services, provided by women in the case at hand, increases with the 
remuneration granted by marriage. The decision to abandon single life and enter into marriage 
implies new duties – such as ironing, cooking and having sex – that may be differently valued 
by different women, i.e. they have different reservation costs2. Hence, some women will be 
ready to enter into the marriage market with the return of a lower remuneration than others. 
Indicating with b the propensity to offer marriage services, and with Q1 the level of marriage 
services offered when the remuneration is set to 0, the total quantity of marriages supplied QmsS 
is equal to: 
QmsS = Q1 + bR with  b, R, Q1> 0 [2]
The higher the remuneration, the larger the supply. 
The match between supply and demand determines the equilibrium amount of marriages 
Qe and the equilibrium market remuneration Re. Formally: 
Re = (Q0 – Q1) / (a + b) [3]
The demander is not discriminating among suppliers, thus he is unable to provide different 
returns for different suppliers, and the market defines both the equilibrium return Eo, which 
implies the remuneration Re and the level of equilibrium marriages Qe (Figure 1). 
It is straightforward to extend this stylized representation of the marriage market in order to 
include the dynamics linked to marital dissolution, which eventually leaves space for a new 
union. Within this system, we expect that the changing levels of equilibrium remuneration 
facilitate the disruption of established couples. We hypothesize that for an established match 
(a marriage), as the aspirations of women increase, leading to an increase in their reservation 
remuneration, the gain that the man receives from that union decreases. In this changing 
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scenario of costs and opportunities, the demander of marriage services – i.e. the man – sees the 
stimuli to continue the match reduced. 
Figure 1. Stylized representation of the marriage market 
 
What happens if the suppliers of marriage services increase, for instance following the 
increase of female migration? An increase in suppliers of marriage services determines a shift 
to the right of the supply function Sms (S’ms), and thus a new equilibrium point E’0 as well as a 
new remuneration equilibrium R’e (Figure 2). This corresponds to an increase in the total 
amount of marriage services to Q’e. The new equilibrium remuneration R’e, which is lower 
than that of the previous situation, will not be sufficient for some native women with high 
reservation remunerations. Hence, some of them may decide to abandon the match, or the male 
partner may decide not to provide such high remuneration, choosing a more affordable option. 
This changed scenario implies that the total number of native marriages will decline from Qe 
to Qn: This shift represents marriage disruption. Conversely, the difference between Q’e and Qe 
represents new (mixed) matches. 
Note that in this representation (Figure 2) foreign women hold the same reservation 
remuneration distribution as native women, thus the new supply function of marriage services 
S’ms has the same slope as the previous one. Nevertheless, the reservation remuneration of 
foreign women might be better set at a lower level than that of the native women, because they 
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are more in need of remuneration. In this case, the new supply function will be steeper, the 
reduction of the equilibrium remuneration larger, and the displacement of native women in the 
marriage market even greater. 
Figure 2. Stylized representation of the marriage market following an increase in female migration 
 
2.2 The role of education 
An important role is played by the education level of the individuals involved. The level of 
remuneration reservation may change according to individual aspirations, values, gender 
attitudes, and cultural system. These are all aspects that can be captured and synthesized 
through the individual level of education. The level of education can, in fact, be viewed not 
only as a valid surrogate for hard-to-measure concepts like opportunity costs, but also as a valid 
marker of individual autonomy, intellectual abilities, and independence from social norms 
(Castro Martín & Juárez, 1995; Hoem et al., 2001). For women, traditional and family-oriented 
values may push the remuneration reservation downwards, facilitating the match with men with 
male-oriented values; on the contrary, requests for independence and autonomy (often fueled 
by higher levels of education) push the female minimum target of remuneration upwards, 
reducing matching possibilities.  
Let us extend the previous representation of the marriage market by adding educational 
differentials. Broadly speaking, there is assortative mating among agents with a similar level 
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of education – better educated with better educated and less educated with less educated: this 
is induced by the different types of marriage services in demand and on offer. Migrant women, 
even if they hold high human capital, are generally unable to get a return on it because, for 
instance, of insufficient knowledge of the language, or because of difficulties in accessing a 
qualified job. Thus, migrant women are likely to compete in the marriage market with less 
educated native women: who, in general, match less educated men. In our model, we, therefore, 
expect the situation described in Figure 2 to be verified especially among agents with low levels 
of education. We anticipate that the increasing presence of foreign women would be 
particularly disruptive for marriages formed by spouses with lower educational attainments3.  
3. The Feminization of Migration in Italy 
Internationally, there is great interest in the Italian context. This interest stems, first, from 
the dramatic family changes that Italy has witnessed over the last two decades. Among other 
family changes, the total divorce rate increased from around 115 (divorces per 1,000 marriages) 
in 2000 to 182 in 2011 (Istat, 2012). Second, Italy is a country with a long history of emigration, 
but a relatively short history of immigration.  
In the 1970s, Italy was chosen, above all, as a destination by migrant men coming from 
Northern Africa and Albania; women were a small part of the total stock of migrants and about 
80% of them entered Italy to accompany or join family members as caregivers (Del Boca & 
Venturini, 2014). In more recent years, women represent the vast majority of migrants coming 
from Eastern European countries, South America and the Philippines, whereas men are 
overrepresented among migrants coming from, for example, Northern Africa, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh (Table 1; see also Reynaud & Conti, 2011). In addition, the presence of female 
first movers for work characterizes these decades: their presence reached 40% of total entrances 
around 2010 and they represent the principal wage earners for themselves and their families 
(Forbes Martin, 2004).  
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Table 1. Feminization of migration in Italy: Foreign population residing in Italy by gender and area of 
nationality, 2002 and 2009. 
  Men Women Total 
Area of nationality 2002 2009 2002 2009 2002 2009
EU-27 114,244 545,284 172,656 717,325 286,900 1,262,609
Other European countries 192,294 447,970 173,344 541,056 365,638 989,026
Africa 283,989 554,659 180,594 377,134 464,583 931,793
Asia 149,286 383,954 136,646 321,062 285,932 705,016
North America 6,973 8,191 8,572 10,035 15,545 18,226
Center-South America 40,339 121,819 87,707 203,098 128,046 324,917
Others 1,149 1,530 1,580 1,942 2,729 3,472
Total 788,274 2,063,407 761,099 2,171,652 1,549,373 4,235,059
Source: Istat (2012) 
Most migration studies have been gender-blind, focusing on men as the main actors of 
migration and paying little attention to women. Even when women’s migration was recognized 
as an empirical phenomenon, little attention was paid to women moving to a new country for 
work (Cooke, 2008; Kofman, 2011). The case of women’s migration toward Italy offers a 
crucial example of the double meaning of the “feminization of migration”. Feminization refers 
to the increase in the quantity of women who migrate; it points, too, to the transformation of 
women in transnational mobility from movers for family reunification to first movers looking 
for a job (Di Bartolomeo & Marchetti 2013). 
The increase in the number of women first movers toward Italy is essentially attributable to 
the expansion of the demand for family services, in particular for the care of elderly and sick 
relatives. Insufficient support from the national welfare system obliges the family to undertake 
these services. This goes, hand in hand, with the family culture of the country, which relies on 
female labor for the production of labor-intensive family services. Altogether, this state of 
affairs has been sustained with the hiring of additional female labor. Such demands becomes 
even more pressing in the context of a rapidly ageing society and the increasing need for a 
second income in the household to face day-to-day family expenditures. Looking at the labor 
market role of foreign women in Italy, Barone and Mocetti (2010) showed that migrant women 
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are complementary to highly-skilled native women, and even increase their labor supply, 
thanks to this external family services production. Romiti and Rossi (2011) argued, indeed, that 
foreign women workers reduce the probability that native women will quit the labor market 
(retiring early) in order to take care of elderly parents and relatives. Importantly, the hiring of 
“family helpers” is not limited to high-income families; the need for a second income has 
pushed medium and low-income families to look for external help in housework and care, while 
the female spouse is now active on the labor market.  
Altogether, female migrants contribute to a social model of the family as the main producer 
of care services. In the following we might reasonably ask: does the increase of available 
women also affect the marriage market? In particular, we wish here to test whether the 
widespread presence of migrant women correlates with a higher probability of marriage 
disruption in Italy. 
4. Analytical Strategy 
4.1 Data and Sample Selected 
We use data coming from the Italian “Family and Social Subjects” survey (FSS), carried 
out by the Italian National Statistical Office (Istat) in 2009 on a nationally representative 
sample of around 20,000 households, with around 50,000 individuals. The data were collected 
based on a two-stage sampling design. The municipalities are the primary units and the 
households are the secondary units. The municipalities were sampled with probabilities 
proportional to their population size and without replacement; whereas the households were 
drawn with equal probabilities and without replacement. Respondents were interviewed face-
to-face. The overall response rate of the survey was over 80%. 
The 2009 FSS provides detailed retrospective partnership histories. We selected men or 
women born after 1945, who had their first marriage after 1980. Hence, we considered the 
retrospective partnership history for one member of each sampled household. The overall 
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analytical sample includes 12,668 individuals. We focus on the dissolution of the first marriage, 
considering de facto separation as a marker of marital breakdown. De facto separation 
represents a marriage dissolution not yet accompanied by a legal provision. This means, in 
practice, separation because of marital discord. We concentrate on de facto separation because 
this act corresponds to the same life-step for all three categories of separated people: i.e. de 
facto separated; legally separated; and divorced.  
Data for foreign residents comes, instead, from the registry of the resident population, in 
which, from 2002, information on the foreign residents by gender, region of residence, and 
country of origin can be detected. Using this data, we build a set of female migration indicators 
computed as the share of foreign women over the total resident population, by year, region and 
single country of origin or area of origin.  
4.2 Statistical Model  
We estimate a set of discrete-time event history models to study the hazard of a de facto 
separation. We follow marriage until de facto separation occurs or, alternatively, we censor the 
observation in cases of widowhood or by date of the interview. Since data about foreign 
residents are available only for more recent years, the analysis is left-censored, i.e. limited to 
separations from 2003 to 2009. 11.5% of the individuals sampled experienced a de facto 
separation in the relevant period. 
Let us consider individual ݅ with ݅ ൌ 1,… , ܫ living in region ݆ with ݆ ൌ 1,… , ܬ. For each 
individual a set of ܪ individual variables ௜ܺ௝ is collected, as well as a set of ܯcontextual 
variables ௝ܼሺݐሻ for each area. ܺ and ܼ may be either constant or time-varying. The logit 
transformation of the hazard of event (i.e. de facto separation) in time period ݐ for individual ݅ 
living in region ݆, ݄௜௝ሺݐሻ, is given by 
logitൣh୧୨ሺtሻ൧ ൌ αሺtሻ ൅ β୦X୦୧୨ሺtሻ ൅ β୫Z୫୨ሺtሻ 
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where αሺtሻ represents some function of the time, called the logit of the baseline hazard function, 
and β୦ and β୫ are the slope parameters for the individual and contextual covariates. This model 
uses logistic regression to estimate the log-odds of a separation occurring in each person-year 
interval as a function of the individual’s marriage duration, and time-constant and time-varying 
individual and aggregate-level characteristics.  
This procedure implies that we have repeated measures for each individual, thus implying 
that observations on the same subject are not independent. Moreover, our data are 
hierarchically structured, with individuals living in different regions, with different marital 
disruption patterns and different migration levels. To account for dependence among 
observations and among regions, we adjusted the estimates utilizing robust standard errors 
(Cleves et al. 2008). 
4.3 Individual-level covariates 
In our models we accounted for the duration of the marriage – that represents our baseline 
duration – including two terms: a variable continuous in years and a quadratic term. Then, we 
considered a range of additional covariates. As basic demographic controls, we included gender 
(coded 0 for men and 1 for women) and birth cohort (grouped into: 1 = 1945-54; 2 = 1955-64; 
3 = 1965-74;4 = ≥1975). Previous analyses for Italy have also shown that the presence of 
children reduces any separation risk, because they tend to be considered as couple-specific 
capital (De Rose, 1992; Vignoli & Ferro, 2009). We thus included a time-varying variable 
indicating whether the respondent has children (1 = yes). 
Educational qualification has been proved to be powerful source of variation in disruption 
risks in Italian marriages (De Rose, 1992; Vignoli & Ferro, 2009). We thus created the 
following educational attainment groups: primary (1); secondary and upper-secondary (2); and 
post-secondary and tertiary (3). In addition, as proxy for the family background, we considered 
parental education (1 = if at least one parent holds a university degree). The parents’ 
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educational level may be understood as an indicator of the socio-economic level of the 
childhood place of residence (Billari & Ongaro, 1999). In addition, higher education among 
parents may also reflect exposure to more liberal attitudes, and acceptance of divorce among 
their offspring (Vignoli & Ferro, 2009). 
4.4 Aggregate-level covariates 
Female migration indicators represented our main explanatory aggregate-level variables in 
the assessment of the hazard of de facto separation. Our aggregate-level indicators were 
temporally lagged by one year: this means that they were measured one year prior to the event 
of interest (i.e. de facto separation), thereby allowing a proper temporal ordering of events. 
In a preliminary analysis, we tested a large set of indicators distinct by single country of 
origin and/or area of origin: e.g. Europe, Asia, North America, Latin America, and Africa. In 
several cases, they proved not to be significant, thus, beside the presence of the total stock of 
resident female foreign population, we limit the presentation to those reporting a significant 
association with the outcome variable: the female resident foreign population coming from 
certain Latin American countries (namely, Peru, Cuba, Colombia, Argentina, and Venezuela), 
and from some Eastern European countries (Poland, Russia, and Belarus). 
Finally, in order to account for differences across regions and across time, we included, in 
the equation, other variables for the regional labor market context. There was, first, the long-
term unemployment rate, to give a sense of the structural characteristics of the labor market in 
each region. It is often used interchangeably with a simple regional fixed effect. Second, we 
considered the employment rate, and aimed to identify the time trend for each region. Given 
its cyclical nature, this indicator is often used to proxy annual time dummies. Third, we 
included the gross domestic product (expressed in millions of Euros purchasing power 
standard) to capture contingent regional variations, which have not yet been transformed into 
occupations. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Effects of aggregate-level migration indicators 
The effects of aggregate-level indicators for foreign female population with the risk of de 
facto separation are presented in the form of Average Marginal Effects (AMEs hereafter) and 
displayed in Table 2. AME expresses the effect on separation risk as a categorical covariate x1 
changes from one category to another or as a continuous covariate increase of one unit, 
averaged across the values of the other covariates introduced in the model (i.e. population-
averaged). Hence, the AME of the aggregate level of female migration represents the 
percentage points change in the predicted probabilities of separation, averaged across the 
values of other covariates, as this indicator increases by one unit.  
Model 1 shows that an increase in the percentage of female foreign resident population over 
the Italian one is not significantly associated with a significant increase in de facto separation 
risk: AME expressed in percentage points equal to 0.0057, Model 1. In order to test whether 
the make-up of women’s migration matters in the dissolution of Italian marriages, we focus on 
areas of origin. Among all areas of origin under consideration, only female migrants coming 
from some countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America had a significant effect on native 
marriages. In particular, an increase of one point in the percentage of foreign female resident 
population from selected countries of Latin America (namely, Peru, Cuba, Colombia, 
Argentine, and Venezuela; see Model 2) was associated with an increase of 0.33 percentage 
points in the risk of de facto separation. When considering the percentage of foreign female 
residents coming from the selected countries of Eastern Europe (i.e., Poland, Russia, and 
Belarus; see Model 3), this risk increases by 0.18 percentage points. In other words, an 
association between the risk of marital dissolution and the increasing presence of foreign 
women is detectable. Interestingly, these ethnicities have more women who migrate as first 
movers, rather than for family reunification (Di Bartolomeo &Marchetti 2013). It is worth 
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noting that, though statistically significant, this marginal effect is relatively low in magnitude.  
Table 2. Discrete-time event-history models predicting de facto separation in Italy. Average 
Marginal Effects (AMEs), expressed in percentage points (p.p.), for the individual covariates 
and the aggregate-level indicators of migration stemming from registry of foreign resident 
population  
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
 
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value  
AME 
(p.p.) 
p-
value
Baseline duration    
     Years of marriage (linear term) 0.005 0.075 0.005 0.060  0.005 0.063
     Years of marriage (quadratic term) -0.003 0.028 -0.000 0.024  -0.000 0.020
Women (ref: Men) -0.013 0.256 -0.013 0.232  -0.012 0.250
Cohort (ref: 1945-54)       
     1955-64 0.044 0.006 0.041 0.005  0.038 0.000
     1965-74 0.067 0.001 0.064 0.000  0.058 0.000
>=1975 0.136 0.002 0.133 0.001  0.117 0.000
Education (ref: High)       
     Medium -0.006 0.715 -0.006 0.694  -0.004 0.780
     Low 0.021 0.282 0.020 0.287  0.021 0.230
Having children (ref: No)  -0.246 0.000 -0.232 0.000  -0.218 0.000
Parental education (ref: Medium-high)       
     Low 0.002 0.954 0.004 0.906  0.004 0.900
Contextual covariates       
     Employment rate 0.000 0.902 -0.001 0.493  0.000 0.670
     Long term unemployment rate -0.002 0.524 -0.003 0.390  -0.001 0.670
     Gross Domestic Product 0.000 0.249 0.000 0.039  0.000 0.530
Female resident foreigners      
     Total stock 0.006 0.476     
     From some countries of Latin America   0.329 0.024   
     From some countries of Eastern Europe          0.176 0.020
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5.2 Effects of other covariates 
All the coefficients of the other control variables included in the model (see again Table 2) 
show the expected sign (De Rose 1992; Vignoli & Ferro 2009), which provides an indirect 
general validation of the statistical model itself. By looking together at the two variables 
describing the baseline duration, as marriage duration increases, the risk of separation is 
reduced to a certain point, when it slows down again. The risk of marital dissolution is slightly 
higher for younger cohorts. Having one or more children, as expected, significantly reduces 
the likelihood of de facto separation. Educational level is not significant. This is in line with 
recent papers showing a weakening of the negative educational gradient in marriage dissolution 
(Matysiak, Styrc, & Vignoli 2013), and this also applies to contemporary Italy (Salvini & 
Vignoli 2011). Also, family background, measured through the parental educational level, does 
not appear to be statistically significant. 
The three contextual variables included in the model do not result statistically significant. It 
is worth noting that they did not display any effect even when they were included separately in 
the estimate. Nevertheless, they have been retained in the model in order to account for Italian 
regional heterogeneity. 
5.3 Educational differentials 
In order to get deeper insights into the effects of the aggregate-level of migration on Italian 
separation risk, we re-ran previous models stratifying by level of education. For the sake of 
simplicity, we put higher education (tertiary) against medium and low education (secondary 
and lower). Table 3 reports the results.  
Table 3. Discrete-time event-history models predicting de facto separation in Italy. Average 
Marginal Effects (AMEs), expressed in percentage points (p.p.), for the aggregate-level 
indicators of female migration for the highly-educated people and low-medium educated.
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  High education Low-medium education 
Model Indicator of female resident foreigners AME (p.p.) p-value AME (p.p.) p-value 
1a. Total stock 0.010 0.515 0.0045 0.660
2a. From some countries of Latin America 0.383 0.266 0.3220 0.061
3a. From some countries of Eastern Europe 0.250 0.177 0.1617 0.072
Note: All models are controlled for variables listed in Table 2. 
The models estimated for sub-groups of Italians with a high level of education do not show 
immigrants having a significant effect on marital dissolution. None of the indicators about 
female migration considered display statistical precision. On the contrary, for less educated 
people the risk of de facto separation increases as the presence of foreign women coming from 
Latin America and Eastern Europe becomes more relevant. Again, the magnitude of this 
association is rather moderate (0.32 and of 0.16 percentage points, respectively for the two 
geographical areas, both significant at the 10% level). This result is interesting, considering 
that educational level did not represent a significant discriminant on the risk of marital 
dissolution for Italians on average (see Table 2). 
5.4 Robustness checks 
Our findings may not be valid without a series of sensitivity checks. First, instead of data 
from the registry of foreign resident population, we estimated similar models relying on a 
different source for migration data, namely the registry of residency permits. The pattern of 
results remained virtually unchanged: the results are not shown, but they are available upon 
request from the authors. Nonetheless, the residency permits dataset presents some caveats: it 
includes information by gender starting only from 2006, and people coming from some Eastern 
European countries are excluded from the determination of residency permits in most recent 
years, because of their entry to the European Union. Hence, we decided to present only results 
from the registry of the resident foreign population. 
Second, we claim that there is no endogeneity at play between migration and marriage 
dissolution dynamics. In fact, it is worth stressing that, of course, immigrants comes to Italy 
for work, without any intention of altering the Italian marriage market. Nonetheless, we 
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conducted a robustness check to scrutinize the potential endogeneity between rising female 
migration and union dissolution. If the relationship were spurious – that is, if we observed a 
positive link between the presence of female migrants and union dissolution because the two 
phenomena are increasing in parallel – one should naturally detect the same pattern among 
male migrants. In this robustness check, male migration indicators thus represent our main 
explanatory aggregate-level variables in the assessment of the hazard of de facto separation: 
and, we also tested a large set of indicators by single country of origin and/or area of origin. 
Interestingly, we found that none of the models including the male component of foreign 
presence illustrates significant effects on marital dissolution risk of natives (Table 1A). This 
result confirms that the association between women’s migration and the marital disruption of 
natives is not spurious.   
Third, we considered a large series of aggregate-level covariates describing different sources 
of variations between regions. We tested several combinations between activity, employment 
and unemployment rates, distinguishing between male and female indicators, long-term 
unemployment rates, diffusion of higher levels of education, different measurement scales of 
gross domestic product, as well as regional fixed effects. Any specific combination between 
them did not substantially change the results (Table 1B). The three selected variables were 
chosen in light of their relevance in describing the economic characteristics of the Italian 
regions.   
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper focuses on the interplay between migration and the marital dissolution of Italians. 
We asked whether aggregate migration shocks alter the marriage market. Our findings suggest 
that they do. We show, indeed, that the higher the foreign female presence, the higher the 
dissolution risk of established marriages. The composition of women’s migration is especially 
relevant. Our outcomes suggest that the increasing presence of women first movers (especially 
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those coming from Latin America and Eastern Europe) is associated with increasing separation 
risks. Although the magnitude of disruption risk is relatively low, the evidence suggests that 
the growing presence of female migrants may disrupt native marriages. 
Our study may thus stimulate new perspectives. The presence of “family helpers” – very 
often women first movers – has traditionally been considered as an element contributing to 
preserve the Italian welfare system, where its first and most important pillar is the family itself. 
In this context, while foreign women tend to be complementary to Italian women in the labor 
market (Barone & Mocetti, 2010; Romiti & Rossi, 2011), helping to fulfill household and care 
work, they also seem to affect the stability of native marriages. The association between the 
presence of migrant women and marital dissolution was found to be relevant especially for 
less- and medium-educated individuals. Thus, migrant women may be in competition in the 
marriage market with Italian women, perhaps particularly less educated Italian women. 
To conclude, this analysis offers new insights into family changes in recent immigration 
countries. Empirical studies concentrating on individual-level factors affecting marital 
dissolution risks – such as marriage duration, presence of children, or women’s education – 
have a long tradition (e.g., Amato & Rogers 1997; Härkönen & Dronkers 2006; Lyngstad & 
Jalovaara 2010; Matysiak, Styrc, & Vignoli 2013). But the study of contextual-level 
determinants for divorce is much less well established. In this paper, we propose a potentially 
new, and never investigated, contextual correlate of marital disruption. We suggest the 
relevance of migrants as a potential driver of new family life courses, at least for Italy; with 
effects depending on country of origin. Our results need to be read as pointers for further 
research, whether they can be extrapolated remain to be seen. 
1 For a more detailed analysis of the marriage market from an economic point of view, see Grossbard-Shechtman 
(2003). In Chapter 1 the author employs a similar model, but she did not analyze migration. The imbalances in 
the marriage market were also considered by Guttemberg and Secord (1983), but again they did not consider any 
macro level shock. 
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2 We define the reservation cost as the cost that a partner has to put up with to enter into a marriage. The 
remuneration has to be higher than the cost. This definition is inspired by the reservation wage, or the money that 
a worker has to receive to accept to enter into the labor market. 
3Notably, there are remarkable levels of educational assortative mating between spouses in Italy – in 2008 almost 
70% of Italian spouses had the same level of education (Vignoli et al., 2011) – justifying a segmentation of the 
Italian marriage market by levels of education. 
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Appendix 
Table 1A. Marginal Effects (AMEs), expressed in percentage points (p.p.), for the individual 
covariates and the aggregate-level indicators of male migration stemming from registry of 
foreign resident population  
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
 
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value  
AME 
(p.p.) 
p-
value
Baseline duration    
     Years of marriage (linear term) 0,006 0,131 0,006 0,068  0,005 0,073
     Years of marriage (quadratic term) 0,000 0,051 0,000 0,026  0,000 0,025
Women (ref: Men) -0,019 0,249 -0,014 0,242  -0,013 0,250
Cohort (ref: 1945-54)    
     1955-64 0,063 0,017 0,043 0,005  0,043 0,006
     1965-74 0,096 0,005 0,066 0,001  0,065 0,001
>=1975 0,194 0,004 0,137 0,001  0,132 0,001
Education (ref: High)    
     Medium -0,009 0,706 -0,006 0,707  -0,005 0,752
     Low 0,028 0,306 0,021 0,282  0,022 0,258
Having child(ren) (ref: No)  -0,331 0,001 -0,242 0,000  -0,240 0,000
Parental education (ref: Medium-high)    
     Low 0,002 0,972 0,003 0,922  0,003 0,924
Contextual covariates    
     Employment rate 0,003 0,392 0,000 0,748  0,001 0,685
     Long term unemployment rate -0,001 0,766 -0,003 0,399  -0,002 0,606
     Gross Domestic Product 0,000 0,475 0,000 0,070  0,000 0,433
Male resident foreigners    
     Total stock -0,009 0,563    
     From some countries of Latin America  0,395 0,075   
     From some countries of Eastern Europe   0,297 0,103
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Table 2A. Marginal Effects (AMEs), expressed in percentage points (p.p.), for the individual covariates, the aggregate-level indicators of female 
migration stemming from registry of foreign resident population, and different contextual-level economic indicators  
  Total activity rate 
Male 
activity rate 
Female 
activity rate 
Total empl. 
rate 
Male empl. 
rate 
Female 
empl. rate 
 
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value
AME 
(p.p.) 
p-
value
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value 
Baseline duration 0,006 0,229 0,006 0,134 0,006 0,233 0,006 0,193 0,006 0,158 0,006 0,196 
     Years of marriage (linear term) 0,000 0,082 0,000 0,047 0,000 0,083 0,000 0,068 0,000 0,057 0,000 0,069 
     Years of marriage (quadratic term) -0,019 0,243 -0,014 0,249 -0,020 0,242 -0,017 0,244 -0,015 0,246 -0,019 0,244 
Women (ref: Men)   
Cohort (ref: 1945-54) 0,062 0,025 0,047 0,011 0,069 0,025 0,057 0,019 0,051 0,015 0,063 0,020 
     1955-64 0,094 0,008 0,070 0,003 0,103 0,008 0,086 0,006 0,076 0,004 0,094 0,006 
     1965-74 0,188 0,006 0,139 0,002 0,208 0,005 0,173 0,004 0,153 0,003 0,189 0,004 
>=1975   
Education (ref: High) -0,008 0,722 -0,005 0,747 -0,009 0,715 -0,007 0,718 -0,006 0,732 -0,008 0,710 
     Medium 0,028 0,308 0,022 0,297 0,031 0,303 0,026 0,304 0,024 0,303 0,029 0,303 
     Low -0,324 0,002 -0,254 0,001 -0,351 0,002 -0,302 0,001 -0,274 0,001 -0,324 0,001 
Having child(ren) (ref: No)    
Parental education (ref: Medium-high) 0,002 0,971 0,002 0,974 0,003 0,962 0,002 0,974 0,002 0,979 0,002 0,965 
     Low 0,003 0,102 0,000 0,494 0,003 0,067 0,002 0,110 0,001 0,244 0,002 0,072 
Contextual covariate -0,002 0,233 0,009 0,904 -0,009 0,163 0,000 0,275 0,006 0,600 -0,005 0,192 
Total stock of female resident foreigners 0,006 0,229 0,006 0,134 0,006 0,233 0,006 0,193 0,006 0,158 0,006 0,196 
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Table 2A. following 
  total unempl. rate 
male 
unempl. rate 
total upper 
sec. education 
long term 
unempl. rate 
gdp (pps 
per inhabitant)
gdp (pps in 
million Euros) 
 
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value
AME 
(p.p.) 
p-
value
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value
AME 
(p.p.)
p-
value 
Baseline duration 0,006 0,117 0,006 0,118 0,004 0,074 0,005 0,115 0,006 0,134 0,006 0,089 
     Years of marriage (linear term) 0,000 0,041 0,000 0,043 0,000 0,029 0,000 0,040 0,000 0,046 0,000 0,031 
     Years of marriage (quadratic term) -0,014 0,248 -0,016 0,246 -0,009 0,235 -0,014 0,250 -0,015 0,248 -0,014 0,254 
Women (ref: Men)   
Cohort (ref: 1945-54) 0,047 0,009 0,053 0,011 0,029 0,006 0,043 0,009 0,049 0,011 0,048 0,006 
     1955-64 0,071 0,002 0,079 0,002 0,043 0,001 0,066 0,001 0,073 0,002 0,071 0,001 
     1965-74 0,144 0,001 0,158 0,002 0,087 0,001 0,135 0,001 0,147 0,002 0,141 0,001 
>=1975   
Education (ref: High) -0,006 0,729 -0,006 0,728 -0,002 0,737 -0,005 0,730 -0,006 0,744 -0,005 0,740 
     Medium 0,023 0,293 0,025 0,296 0,017 0,273 0,022 0,291 0,023 0,290 0,023 0,286 
     Low -0,259 0,000 -0,281 0,001 -0,169 0,000 -0,241 0,000 -0,264 0,001 -0,258 0,000 
Having child(ren) (ref: No)    
Parental education (ref: Medium-high) 0,002 0,971 0,002 0,973 0,003 0,959 0,002 0,974 0,002 0,966 0,002 0,966 
     Low -0,001 0,194 -0,002 0,200 0,005 0,172 0,003 0,137 -0,003 0,420 0,000 0,274 
Contextual covariate 0,005 0,803 0,004 0,809 0,000 0,984 0,001 0,732 0,003 0,848 0,010 0,064 
Total stock of female resident foreigners 0,006 0,117 0,006 0,118 0,004 0,074 0,005 0,115 0,006 0,134 0,006 0,089 
 
